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The process of government formation in parliamentary democracies has far-reaching 
implications for the delegation of power, accountability, and policy outcomes. Although there 
is a substantial literature on government formation, it is largely focussed on established, 
mainly West European, democracies in which institutions are stable, actors are politically 
socialized in the system, and voters are routinely faced with a familiar array of choices at 
elections.1 Conversely, very little is known about government formation in new democracies 
in which these features are less evident. Can we therefore reasonably expect the explanations 
for government formation in long-established democracies to “travel” to new democracies? If 
not, then what else should be taken into account?  
 
One of the key differences between established and new democracies is the extent of party 
system institutionalization.2 Party systems set the parameters within which coalition 
bargaining takes place and provide actors in the process with the information – relative party 
strength and ideological positions – needed to make strategic calculations on potential 
coalition configurations. But in new democracies, party systems are less institutionalized and 
the patterned interactions between parties that are evident in established democracies are not 
frequently observed. Instead, parties experience large fluctuations in parliamentary strength 
from election-to-election, new relevant parties frequently emerge onto the political scene, and 
parties fail to develop stable programmatic appeals which other actors in the bargaining 
process can use as informative cues for decision-making. All of which introduces a greater 
level of uncertainty into the coalition formation process.  
 
In this research, I argue that weak party system institutionalization has three implications for 
the study of government formation in new democracies. First, in established democracies 
incumbents are generally thought to possess an advantage in the coalition formation process3 
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but when party systems are not institutionalized incumbents may be much weakened or even 
excluded from parliament following the next round of elections.4 Second, former dominant 
parties can inhibit the development of programmatic interaction between participants in the 
coalition formation process.5 Finally, the entry of new parties can add considerable 
uncertainty to the coalition bargaining process as they are “unknown entities”. This is 
exacerbated in new democracies where weakly institutionalized party systems can allow new 
parties to enter the bargaining process with considerable legislative strength.6 
 
This research therefore makes three contributions to the existing literature. It is the first study 
of government formation that examines the effect of party system institutionalization, 
focussing specifically on the differences that arise when party systems are weakly 
institutionalized. Second, it highlights some of the distinctive features of government 
formation in new democracies. Finally, it does this by presenting the first study of 
government formation in new democracies that is methodologically comparable to the 
leading research on Western Europe in which the government formation opportunity is 
selected as the unit of analysis.  
 
The analysis is based on a new dataset of 27,000 potential governments in 10 new 
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) between 1990 and 2011.7 Previous studies 
of government formation in new democracies have adopted empirical strategies that use 
individual parties8 or cabinet coalition status as the unit of analysis.9 This literature has 
provided some interesting results, however, the central question for scholars of government 
formation is not why a particular party got into government but instead why one coalition 
was chosen over the numerous available alternatives in any given bargaining situation. 
Providing answers to this question requires data for every potential government that could 
4 
 
form in each formation opportunity and an estimation strategy that takes into account that 
potential governments are interrelated; if one potential government is more likely to form the 
cabinet then some other choice alternatives will be less likely.10 In this research I address this 
issue by using the mixed effects logit model as described by Glasgow et al. 
 
The results of the analysis provide support for the proposition that weak party system 
institutionalization influences government formation in new democracies. Potential coalitions 
that closely resemble the incumbent government are less likely to take office when the 
formation opportunity occurs following an election. This reflects the volatility of incumbent 
party bargaining power which tends to decline as governments fail to fulfil policy 
expectations and engage in clientelist or corrupt practices in new democracies. On the other 
hand, incumbency is an advantage when the formation opportunity arises during a 
parliamentary term. This is an indicator of the incoherence of interactions between opposition 
parties in the legislature which is another characteristic of weak party system 
institutionalization. The results also show that former dominant parties are much less likely to 
form the government and this effect is stronger in later elections. The Communist Successor 
Parties’ (CSP) inability to develop the kind of programmatic links with the electorate that are 
common to institutionalized parties, combined with their failure to form political alliances 
with other parties based on ideological congruence has placed CSPs at a systematic 
disadvantage in the coalition formation process. Finally, and contrary to expectations, 
although new parties achieve notable electoral success in CEE, a potential coalition that 
contains a new party is less likely to form the cabinet than other potential coalitions however, 
this finding is not statistically significant. On this particular dimension, weak party system 
institutionalization does not influence government formation in new democracies.   
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Taken together, these results provide new insights into the determinants of government 
formation. The data used here draws specifically on the new democracies of CEE, where the 
parliamentary institutional arrangements are comparable to those commonly found in 
Western Europe.11 However, the implications of this research are potentially generalizable to 
presidential multi-party systems such as the new democracies of Latin America where it is 
argued that there are strong incentives for legislative coalition-building even in the absence of 
the executive’s need to retain the confidence of the legislature.12 
 
Party system institutionalization and government formation 
 
The theoretical literature on government formation has offered a large number of 
explanations that have informed empirical research.13 Early office-seeking theories provide 
the expectation that actors in the government formation process will seek to form minimal 
winning governments14 while policy-seeking models emphasise the importance of ideological 
compatibility between coalition partners and parties’ strategic position in the policy space.15 
More recently, scholars have sought to demonstrate the centrality of institutions, focussing on 
the importance of portfolio allocation, the structure of the bargaining process, and the formal 
and informal rules of the game.16 A common thread that runs through the theoretical literature 
is the assumption that the current bargaining environment contains all the information that 
actors need to make decisions regarding coalition formation. Prior experience, historical 
factors, and past behavior are absent from almost all theories.17 This is surprising as we know 
from empirical studies that parties’ past behavior influences coalition membership18 and 
research has also shown that parties prefer to form coalitions with ‘familiar’ partners.19 For 
actors in the government formation process the ability to draw on experience and use 
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retrospective judgements of other actors is a way of reducing uncertainty when selecting 
coalition partners. 
 
But this capacity to use experience and retrospective judgement is undermined when actors in 
the formation process frequently change identity, policy preferences, or relative strength in 
the legislature. This points to the importance of patterned interactions between actors in the 
government formation process which only occurs when party systems are institutionalized. 
Most studies of party system institutionalization begin from Huntington’s definition of 
institutionalization as: “The process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and 
stability.”20 For party systems, institutionalization means that “actors entertain clear and 
stable expectations about the behavior of other actors, and hence about the fundamental 
contours and rules of party competition and behavior.”21  
 
More concretely, Mainwaring and Scully identify four conditions of institutionalized party 
systems: first, patterns of party competition should exhibit some regularity. If the identity or 
electoral strength of relevant parties is subject to high levels of fluctuation or complete 
change then a party system is not institutionalized. Second, parties should have stable roots in 
society which enables them to structure preferences and ensure regularity in how people vote. 
Third, the electoral process and political parties are adhered to and respected by major 
political actors, thus conferring legitimacy on them. Finally, party organizations are not 
subordinated to the party leader.22 In this research I focus on the first of these criteria which 
Mainwaring and Scully describe as the most important condition in their framework. In doing 
so, I argue that the stability of politically relevant parties is the defining characteristic of an 
institutionalized party system. This stability is exhibited via low levels of fluctuation in party 
vote share and coherent patterns of interaction between parties based on ideological 
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congruence. Stability or instability results primarily from elections which is the focus of most 
studies of party system institutionalization.23 
 
The institutionalization of the party system therefore has considerable implications for 
government formation. Party systems provide the essential structure of the coalition 
bargaining environment as they contain information on the relative bargaining weights and 
preferences of parties. Each party in the system uses this information when making decisions 
on potential coalition partners. What marks party systems in new democracies as distinct 
from those of established democracies is the lack of ‘systemness’ and concomitant higher 
level of uncertainty.24 Of course, uncertainty can never be completely eliminated from 
decision-making but where party systems are institutionalized, actors can make reasonable 
estimates of the policy preferences of other parties and their likelihood of retaining their 
legislative strength following an election. 
 
Numerous empirical studies have shown that the party systems of new democracies are 
weakly institutionalized compared to established democracies.25 Various measures have been 
used to demonstrate this though the most common is electoral volatility which assesses the 
stability of party competition. In established democracies average volatility since the 
inauguration of democracy has been 11 points as measured by the Pedersen index, but in new 
democracies this rises to 35 and in CEE it is higher still at 42.26 Furthermore, new parties 
have found it easy to gain electoral support and break into party systems in new democracies 
which is an indicator of open and unstable structures of party competition.27 Between 1990 
and 2004 an average of 5.6 new parties emerged at each election in CEE with an average vote 
share of 19 percent while Mainwaring et al. found that new parties received 35 percent of the 
vote between 1990 and 2002 in five Latin American countries.28 By contrast, between 1945 
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and 1991 an average of only one new party entered Western party systems, winning an 
average of just 2 percent of the vote.29 A final measure of party system institutionalization is 
the level of partisanship among the electorate; this is an indicator of the rootedness of 
political parties in society. High levels of partisanship can also serve to stabilize party vote 
shares and thus reduce electoral volatility.30 Partisanship tends to be lower in new 
democracies with 37 percent of voters expressing a partisan attachment compared to 54 
percent in established democracies.31 There are, of course, variations within the universe of 
new democracies and Noam Lupu has shown that partisanship in parts of Latin America 
resembles that of established democracies.32 
 
This all indicates that the patterns of interaction between parties in the coalition bargaining 
environment are subject to substantial change from one formation opportunity to the next, 
suggesting that some of regularities associated with government formation in the established 
literature may be absent or function differently in new democracies. Additional factors that 
are specific to new democracies also need to be considered. In the following sections I outline 
three implications of weak party system institutionalization for government formation. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The incumbency (dis)advantage 
 
Incumbency is usually seen as an advantage for participants in the government formation 
process.33 Powell found that incumbents held onto office around 44 percent of the time 
following an election and were replaced completely just 17 percent of the time34 while Martin 
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and Stevenson showed that 35 percent of incumbent coalition governments immediately 
returned to office.35  
 
Two factors provide the theoretical foundations of the incumbency advantage. First, parties 
have a preference to form governments with previous coalition allies as they are familiar with 
their policy preferences, internal constraints and modes of working. Previous experience of 
working together also reduces the bargaining costs of government formation.36 Second, some 
institutional rules and practices favor incumbents. An incumbent cabinet can act as a 
reversion point in coalition negotiations which gives it an advantage if a new alternative 
government cannot be formed.37 The rules for selecting a formateur can also hand 
incumbents an advantage. In some systems incumbent parties are given the first opportunity 
to form a new government,38 while the party of the incumbent prime minister is more likely 
to be selected as the formateur.39 The prime minister is likely to favor re-forming a cabinet 
with previous governing allies unless poor election results or intra-coalition disputes preclude 
this. However, the effect of the constitutional rules of government formation can be 
discounted in some new democracies. For example, across CEE no country gives incumbents 
the first shot at forming a new government. In most instances, convention dictates that the 
largest party in the legislature will be asked by the head of state or the speaker of the 
legislature to try and form a government.40 
 
The observable incumbency advantage in established democracies leads Bernhard and 
Karakoç to note that incumbency disadvantage is evidence of irregular patterns of party 
competition.41 By deduction, we may then, expect to find an incumbency disadvantage in 
new democracies where party competition is less regularized due to weak party system 
institutionalization. Prior research has shown that incumbents in Latin America and the 
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Caribbean tend not to be returned to office.42 Similarly, in CEE Roberts found that just under 
a third of governing parties returned to office following elections and only two of the thirty-
four incumbent governments he examined were returned in their entirety.43 Single country 
studies of Brazil and India have also reported evidence of an incumbency disadvantage.44 
Conversely, both Druckman and Roberts and Döring and Hellström have found that 
incumbent parties are more likely to become members of the new cabinet in CEE.45 
 
The existing literature therefore indicates that there is a link between weakly institutionalized 
party systems and incumbency disadvantage but how can this be explained? The principal 
explanation is that incumbents are most likely to be affected by high levels of electoral 
volatility that afflict new democracies. There are two reasons for this; first, incumbents in 
new democracies suffer from what Roberts terms hyperaccountability. This is a combination 
of poor incumbent performance on key policy issues (such as unemployment) together with a 
more generalized propensity to vote against governing parties.46 In the latter case it is argued 
that politicians have been unable to deliver on policy promises as the demands of transition 
and modernization exceeded the capacity of governments to act.47 This is particularly true in 
CEE where wholesale economic reform often bore high short-term costs with the promise of 
medium-to-long-term benefits.48 However, politicians could only promise ‘jam tomorrow’ so 
many times before voters tired of waiting and soon anti-political parties began to emerge to 
offer these voters an electoral outlet for their disappointment.49 Indeed, CEE electorates have 
demonstrated a great proclivity to punish parties for poor policy performance.50 Roberts has 
shown that 88 percent of governments lost votes at elections in CEE with an average loss of 
15 per cent – more than five times greater than the average loss for governing parties in 
established democracies.51 
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The second explanation for why incumbents will particularly suffer from high levels of 
electoral volatility is corruption. Voters prefer effective governments to ineffective 
governments and when incumbents are found to be corrupt or incompetent, they are likely to 
experience electoral losses.52 New democracies are more likely to exhibit higher levels of 
corruption than established democracies due to the incentives and opportunities on offer.53 In 
terms of opportunities, the economic reform process in CEE offered government officials 
numerous avenues to engage in rent-extraction by shaping legislation and influencing the 
privatization process. The incentives for corruption are further increased where party linkages 
are not based on programmatic appeals but instead on the personalistic or clientelistic appeals 
that are associated with weakly institutionalized party systems.54 When partisan appeals are 
absent, parties have less status and value of their own. Their success or failure becomes 
inextricably linked to that of the party leaders which increases the incentives to engage in 
exploitative or corrupt practices since the survival and integrity of the party are not the 
leaders’ primary concerns; Kitschelt has noted that there is an empirical association between 
clientelist linkage politics and political corruption.55 Furthermore, recent research has shown 
that when the rewards for rent-extracting behavior increase over time due to learning, the 
build up of rent-extracting networks, and fiscal windfalls, the likelihood that incumbency 
conveys a disadvantage increases. This is due to the desire of voters to replace corrupt 
incumbents even with challengers of lower quality.56   
 
Taken together, hyperaccountability and corruption lead to higher levels of electoral volatility 
that particularly afflict governing parties. As a result, incumbent party bargaining power 
declines from one election to the next, thus incurring an incumbency disadvantage. 
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This indicates that incumbency is a disadvantage due to the highly changeable nature of the 
coalition bargaining environment in new democracies which largely occurs following 
elections when voters can pass judgement on governing parties. However, government 
formation opportunities frequently arise between elections, particularly in CEE – around half 
of the formation opportunities in the dataset for this research occurred during a parliamentary 
term. In such instances large scale changes in the bargaining environment are unlikely to 
have taken place. Even so, weak party system institutionalization can influence the formation 
process but in a different way. 
 
Governments terminate mid-term for a variety of reasons, often due to the loss of a vote of 
no-confidence resulting from a coalition partner exiting the cabinet. But these governments 
frequently re-form without an election being held. Frequently, the government that re-forms 
is a minority administration comprised of a subset of parties from the prior cabinet. One of 
the reasons for this is that with weakly institutionalized party systems the parliamentary 
opposition is incoherent, often fragmented, and incapable of acting as a bloc. For example, in 
Poland, the 2001 majority coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Peasant Party 
(PSL) governed until 2003 when the PSL was expelled and subsequently, an SLD minority 
government managed to stay in power until the next election due to the weakness of the 
opposition.57 Thus I expect the role of incumbency in new democracies to be dynamic: if the 
formation opportunity occurs following an election, incumbency will be a disadvantage. If 
the formation opportunity occurs during a parliamentary term then incumbency will be an 
advantage. 
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Former dominant parties 
 
In many new democracies the former ruling authoritarian party persists as a relevant political 
actor in the democratic era. These reinvented dominant parties are often ideologically 
moderate and therefore, not analogous to extremist or anti-system parties found in established 
democracies. However, their very presence has an impact on both party system 
institutionalization and, in turn, government formation.58 
 
Former dominant parties affect party system institutionalization by influencing the stability of 
politically relevant parties and the development of regularized interactions between parties in 
the system. On the one hand, in transitional democracies the ex-ruling party is usually the 
most organized and best resourced party so it can act as an anchor for the nascent party 
system around which other contenders can develop.59 Grzymała-Busse offers a more nuanced 
view, arguing that the mode of a dominant party’s exit from power and its subsequent 
reinvention shapes institutionalization. Where former ruling parties negotiated the transition 
to democracy with a recognizable opposition as in Hungary, Poland and Taiwan60, thus 
ceding its capacity to exploit state resources, and the parties themselves remained unified in 
the post-authoritarian era rather than dispersing into numerous other parties, robust 
competition was more likely to develop.61 Where the former ruling parties dominated the 
transition process and ex-elites fragmented into various new parties, competition for office 
was much less routinized. 
 
In terms of government formation, two factors are relevant. The first is the extent to which 
other parties were tolerated under the dominant party regime.62 This affects the degree to 
which alternatives to the dominant party were already partly institutionalized at the onset of 
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democracy. In Mexico and South Korea parties were allowed to compete in elections that 
maintained the facade of legitimacy for the regime, meaning voters already had a level of 
familiarity with the party alternatives.63 By contrast, in CEE the party-state completely 
dominated political life and opposition organizations were not tolerated. As such, opposition 
parties with a coherent organization were largely absent; instead the opposition was made up 
of umbrella organizations of many smaller outfits. One effect of the pervasive nature of the 
Communist Parties in CEE was also to foster a deep distrust of the very notion of a ‘political 
party’, and in particular, of the former ruling parties even after their post-authoritarian 
reinventions. Therefore, the establishment of stable, relevant political parties has been more 
difficult in CEE states. 
 
The second factor relating to the role of former dominant parties is the effect that they have 
on the content of party competition. Party systems are more likely to become institutionalized 
where party competition is based on underlying societal cleavages; in their examination of 
Latin America, Roberts and Wibbels show that where cleavages are fluid, electoral volatility 
tends to be higher.64 However, former dominant parties can prevent the development of 
regularized party competition if other actors in the system do not recognize them as ‘normal’ 
participants in party politics. In Taiwan the former ruling Kuomintang (KMT) initially 
responded to its removal from office in 2000 by attacking the managerial competence of the 
new government. However, as these attacks failed, the KMT soon learned to begin competing 
with the Democratic Progressive Party-led government on policy issues that reflected salient 
cleavages, which helped to routinize competition between parties.65 By contrast, in CEE party 
competition for much of the democratic period, and particularly competition for government, 
was structured by the ‘regime divide’ between successors to the former ruling parties and the 
successors to the parties that made up the opposition at the transition to democracy.66 This 
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repeated recycling of old hostilities meant that Communist Successor Parties struggled to 
become regular players in the coalition game as parties in the system did not interact on the 
basis of ideological or policy congruence.  
 
It is therefore expected that in new democracies where opposition parties were not tolerated 
under authoritarian rule and subsequent party competition takes place along a ‘regime divide’ 
rather than on programmatic differences between parties, coalitions that contain the 
successors to former dominant parties will be less likely to take office.  
 
However, one of the expectations of democratic consolidation is that party systems will 
become more institutionalized over time. If so, this would mean that party competition 
develops into contestation over policy, particularly once former dominant parties have been 
in government and can then compete on the basis of their record.67 One would also expect 
that as the elites who first contested the struggle for democracy exit the political scene and 
are replaced by politicians that had no first-hand stake in that battle, then matters of policy 
and competence would override historical divisions. 
 
Does this, then, suggest that former dominant parties’ chances of forming the government 
will improve as democracy wears on? This depends on the conduct of those parties once they 
are able to compete on the basis of their records. If former dominant parties become regular 
players in the coalition bargaining arena then they are subject to the same vagaries of politics 
as all other parties. As the former ruling parties managed to gain office in many CEE 
countries during the tumultuous period of early democratic and economic reform, few 
competed with positive records at subsequent elections and were susceptible to challenges 
from new anti-establishment parties that emerged during the ‘third generation elections.’68 I 
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therefore hypothesize that former dominant parties will be less likely to form the government 
in the late-democratic period.69 
 
A final hypothesis on the role of dominant parties in the government formation process is 
drawn from the empirical literature. Druckman and Roberts have argued that CSPs in CEE 
are more likely to form oversized coalitions when they do get into government. This allows 
coalition partners “to distance themselves from the CSP in the eyes of voters and thus 
minimize electoral punishment” and also acts as a moderating effect on potentially extreme 
policies that the CSP may propose.70 Preliminary evidence suggests that CSPs tend to form 
oversized governments but this hypothesis is untested in a rigorous model of government 
formation. Therefore, this study tests the hypothesis that dominant parties are more likely to 
form oversized coalitions. 
 
New parties 
 
The accession of new parties to the party system is not unique to new democracies but the 
frequency and prima facie success of these parties in CEE in particular is not replicated in 
Western Europe.71 New parties entering parliament have a number of potential consequences 
for government formation. Firstly, they increase the level of complexity in coalition 
negotiations as established actors may be unsure of their policy positions, internal 
organization, and particular circumstances. For example, is it possible to determine if a new 
party will be a disciplined and reliable coalition partner? Furthermore, if the entry of new 
parties to the party system is a frequent occurrence, this complexity perpetuates with 
implications not just for government formation but also the quality of representation and 
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policy consistency which are considered to be essential characteristics of a stable 
democracy.72 
 
Although some suggest that new parties find it relatively easy to break into party systems in 
new democracies others demur. Sikk argued that most of the volatility evident in CEE party 
systems is a result of splits and mergers between existing parties.73 Therefore, seemingly new 
parties are not new at all in the sense that they are composed of familiar political actors even 
if their party label has changed. However, the criteria by which new parties are identified can 
lead to vastly differing estimates of volatility. Contrary to Sikk, Powell and Tucker found that 
volatility caused by vote switching between current participants of CEE party systems 
accounts for just 30 per cent of overall volatility.74 Similarly, Tavits showed that the level of 
electoral support gained by new parties is related to voters’ disappointment with the 
alternatives which suggests that voter volatility is responsible for the success of new parties.75 
As new parties still need to compete with established contenders in the government formation 
process it is a stretch too far to claim that new parties possess a significant advantage over 
others during coalition negotiations. A less stringent test is to hypothesize that new parties 
will not be locked out of coalition formation as they may be in established democracies, 
where familiar parties collude to exclude new parties from office.76 I therefore test the 
proposition that coalitions containing new parties will not be significantly less likely to take 
office in new democracies. 
 
Tavits has also demonstrated that new parties were 2.3 times more likely to win seats after 
the third election in a given country.77 This highlights an interesting dynamic of party 
systems in CEE, which seemingly stabilized into familiar patterns of competition between 
centre-right and social democratic parties in the late 1990s. This period, referred to as the 
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‘third generation elections’78, also witnessed a deepening of voter disillusionment as both 
mainstream ideological camps had, by then, experienced disappointing periods in 
government. As a result, voters turned away from mainstream parties and looked towards 
anti-political or unorthodox alternatives. Pop-Eleches shows empirically that the electoral 
success of new parties is significantly greater during this period.79 The demonstrable electoral 
success of new parties in the late-democratic period leads to the expectation that new parties 
will be more likely to enter government during this period. 
 
Empirical design 
 
Assessing government formation requires an empirical design that determines why one 
coalition formed out of the numerous potential alternatives that exist in any given formation 
opportunity. Martin and Stevenson first solved this problem by using a conditional logit (CL) 
model.80 Since then, a number of further studies have been published using their model and 
data but none have examined government formation in new democracies.81 This article 
therefore represents the first examination of government formation in new democracies that 
uses the formation opportunity as the unit of analysis and is comparable to the leading 
research on established democracies.  
 
The empirical method used in this research differs from that specified by Martin and 
Stevenson. The limitations of the CL model have recently been discussed by Glasgow et al. 
who suggest the use of a mixed effects logit (MXL) model as an alternative.82 They argue 
that an MXL model solves the problem of unobserved heterogeneity that can exist when 
contextual factors vary across formation opportunities. Furthermore, the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption upon which the CL model rests can be relaxed in an 
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MXL model.83 This is crucial in the context of the present research as every model discussed 
in the results section exhibited at least one IIA violation when using the CL estimator.84 
 
The MXL model can contain both fixed and random coefficients and therefore, variables can 
vary across formation opportunities. This allows researchers to investigate contextual factors, 
for example, to assess whether party ideology matters more in some circumstances than 
others. The effect of random coefficients in each formation opportunity can be determined by 
adjusting the standard CL model by adding the constant 𝑛𝑡 to the vector of coefficients 𝛽, 
where 𝑡 is the formation opportunity and 𝑥𝑡𝑗 is a vector of independent variables associated 
with government 𝑗 in opportunity 𝑡. 𝑛𝑡 is not observed so researchers must specify a 
distribution for the coefficients and estimate the parameters of the distribution.85 Glasgow et 
al. specify a joint probability distribution 𝑓(𝑛|𝜃) for 𝑛 which I follow in this article, where 𝜃 
are the fixed parameters of distribution 𝑓.86 Doing so, and integrating the augmented CL 
model over the distribution of 𝑛 as weighted by 𝑓 which is the density function of 𝑛, gives 
the unconditional probability that government 𝑖 is selected from 𝑗 alternatives at formation 
opportunity 𝑡. This gives us the MXL model in which:87  
 
    𝑃𝑡𝑖 = ∫ (
exp(𝑥𝑡𝑖𝛽+𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡)
∑ exp(𝑥𝑡𝑗𝛽+𝑥𝑡𝑗𝑛𝑡)
𝐽
𝑗=1
)  𝑓(𝑛|𝜃)d𝑛     (1) 
 
MXL models do not have a closed-form solution and must therefore be estimated by 
maximum simulated likelihood. Similar to Glasgow et al. in each of the models reported in 
this research the log-likelihood is simulated from the results of 200 Halton draws.88 The 
Lagrange multiplier test as recommended by Glasgow et al. was used to determine which 
variables should be entered into the models as random effects.89 All variables that enter the 
20 
 
models as random coefficients are identified in the tables by the presence of an 
accompanying standard deviation statistic. As each model contains slight variations in the 
variables and cases entered, the designation of fixed and random variables can change 
between models. 90 
 
Data and measures 
 
I examine government formation in new democracies using a new dataset of potential 
governments in 10 CEE countries between 1990 and 2011: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. All ten 
countries emerged from authoritarian rule between 1989 and 1991 and are comparable in 
terms of their level of political development. All were also part of the 2004-07 wave of 
European Union expansion. They are all parliamentary or semi-presidential democracies in 
which the executive is reliant on the confidence of the legislature for its survival. Thus, their 
institutional arrangements are broadly comparable to those of West European democracies 
used in other leading studies of government formation.91 However, the results are 
theoretically generalizable to new presidential democracies as the office- and policy-seeking 
motivations for coalition formation remain similar to those in parliamentary democracies.92 
 
The unit of analysis in this research is the formation opportunity which arises if: there is a 
change in the party composition of the government; a parliamentary election is held; the 
prime minister resigns for political reasons; or the cabinet resigns for any reason including 
the loss of a vote of no confidence.93 Using these criteria, 117 formation opportunities are 
identified amounting to 27,507 potential governments. The dependent variable is whether or 
not a potential government went on to form the cabinet which is coded ‘1’ for the coalition 
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that eventually took office and ‘0’ for all other potential governments in a given formation 
opportunity. Caretaker and technocratic cabinets are excluded as they are usually formed 
outside the parameters of normal competitive party politics. Instances of single party majority 
government are dropped from the dataset as coalition formation theories do not apply in these 
cases. Some of the models in the results section contain fewer cases due to lack of data; for 
example, data on party ideology is not always available. The final dataset covering only 
coalition governments with complete data contains 95 formation opportunities and 16,393 
potential cabinets. In some models the first governments in each country are excluded from 
the data as certain variables require information from a prior period of government. As no 
democratically-elected government preceded the first cabinets, the effect of such variables 
cannot be assessed for those cases. 
 
Four independent variables related to party system institutionalization are specified. Two 
variables are used to assess incumbency disadvantage. The first is an indicator which takes a 
value of ‘1’ if a potential coalition contains the party of the incumbent prime minister and ‘0’ 
if not. As governments across the democratic world are heavily identified with the prime 
minister94, it is likely that voters will attribute policy failure primarily to the prime minister’s 
party. Second, I include a measure of the familiarity of the coalition that takes office 
compared to the previous coalition to assess whether the overall government suffers the same 
disadvantage as the prime minister’s party. This measure, labelled similarity in the tables, is 
given as: 
 
     𝐹 = √(
∑𝑗𝑘
∑𝑖𝑘
) 𝑆𝑘     (2) 
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where 𝑗 is the number of parties in the outgoing government that are included in potential 
coalition 𝑘, 𝑖 is the number of parties in the potential coalition and 𝑆 is the fractional seat 
share of the potential coalition. This takes into account the number of incumbent parties that 
form the potential coalition weighted by the overall size of the government. In order to test 
whether the effect of incumbency changes depending on the timing of the formation 
opportunity I interact both measures of incumbency with an indicator of whether or not the 
formation opportunity takes place after an election. 
 
The effect of a former dominant party on coalition formation is assessed using a binary 
indicator of their presence in, or absence from, a potential coalition. To test whether the effect 
of former dominant parties on government formation has changed over time I interact the 
dominant party variable with another variable that takes the value of ‘1’ if the election is a 
‘third generation election’95 and ‘0’ for all other elections. The ‘third generation elections’ 
began from 1997 and 2002 in each country.96 Finally, to assess whether dominant parties in 
CEE are more likely to join oversized coalitions I use an indicator of whether or not a 
potential coalition holds a surplus majority.97 
 
To test the hypothesis that new parties will not be systematically excluded from coalition 
formation in new democracies I use a dichotomous indicator that takes the value of ‘1’ if a 
potential coalition contains a party that had not sat in any previous legislature and ‘0’ for all 
other potential coalitions. Although a party may have competed in previous elections, that 
party is relevant to the coalition formation game only when it succeeds in entering 
parliament. New parties were identified from a number of sources.98 Additional parties were 
added to the dataset using Tavits’ definition: “A new party is one that either results from a 
split from an existing party or is genuinely new in the sense that it emerges without any help 
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from members of existing parties.”99 To assess whether new parties have been more 
successful in the later years of the democratic period I interact the new party variable with the 
indicator of ‘third generation elections’ in CEE.100  
 
A number of control variables are included in the models which are derived from the 
empirical and theoretical literature on government formation in established democracies. 
First, following the work of Riker and von Neumann and Morgenstern indicators are included 
of a potential coalition’s minimal winning and minority status.101 Both theory and empirical 
research suggests that minimal winning governments will be more likely to form and 
minority governments will be less likely to take office as parties need to command a majority 
in parliament in order to retain its confidence but, by the same token, parties want to 
maximize the payoffs of office.102 Second, it is often assumed that the largest party in the 
legislature will be a centripetal actor in coalition negotiations that is difficult to exclude from 
the government.103 Potential coalitions containing the largest party should therefore be more 
likely to take office. Third, according to coalition theory, parties will try to maximize the 
individual payoffs of office by minimizing the number of actors with whom they need to be 
shared.104 We might, then, expect that parties will seek to form smaller coalitions so I include 
a count of the number of parties in each potential government.  
 
Fourth, ideology is seen as central to policy-seeking accounts of government formation.105 
Parties are usually expected to favor forming less ideologically diverse governments in order 
to minimize intra-coalition conflict, however, this assumes that party systems are 
institutionalized and parties compete on the basis of policy or ideology. Where party systems 
are not institutionalized then parties tend to have weak programmatic links with voters and 
less incentive to compete on the basis of policy or underlying cleavages, however, evidence 
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has shown that in Latin America presidents choose to form executive coalitions with 
ideologically proximate parties.106 In CEE, the former dominant parties further complicate 
coalition bargaining based on policy-seeking motivations as they are usually ideologically 
moderate parties that some other parties in the system refuse to countenance as coalition 
partners for historical reasons. Their presence has also seen ideological competition 
subjugated to contestation based on the regime divide. It is therefore difficult to accurately 
predict the effect of ideology on government formation in new democracies but there is 
reason to believe that it will not be as salient as it is in Western Europe. Ideological distance 
on the left-right scale is measured using the rile variable from the Manifesto Data 
Collection.107 I also include an indicator of the ideologically median party in each legislature 
based on coalition theory which suggests that the median actor occupies a strategically 
important position in the policy bargaining space and is therefore difficult to exclude from 
government.108  
 
Finally, I specify an indicator of whether a potential coalition is associated with a pre-
electoral coalition. Some parties make it known prior to an election that they intend to work 
together in government and empirical evidence from established democracies shows that this 
is an important indicator of which government eventually takes office. However, in CEE it is 
not as straightforward to identify such pre-electoral coalitions. Party splits, mergers and 
alliances are frequent and it can also be difficult to strictly identify what is a formal alliance 
and what is a mere pre-electoral coalition. A pre-electoral coalition is defined as a joint 
candidate list or a publicly expressed commitment to coalesce by two or more parties. Any 
potential coalition that contains a pre-electoral coalition is coded as ‘1’ even if it runs under a 
single electoral banner and all other potential coalitions are coded ‘0’. This is less strict than 
Martin and Stevenson’s coding of pre-electoral coalitions109 but it allows me to assess 
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whether parties gain an advantage through participation in such an arrangement even if they 
also need to seek additional governing partners from outside of the pre-electoral coalition.  
To illustrate the coding of pre-electoral coalitions in this research; any potential government 
containing Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) in Poland in 1997 would be coded ‘1’ as AWS 
was a pre-electoral coalition of more than thirty parties. Descriptive statistics and sources for 
all variables can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
Results 
 
Table 1 presents the results of three models of coalition formation in new democracies.110 
The first model tests variables that are common in analyses of coalition formation in Western 
Europe. It can be seen that some of the established theories of government formation transfer 
well to new democracies. Minimal winning coalitions are more likely to take office and 
parties prefer to form smaller coalitions, as indicated by the no. of parties variable, which 
maximize the payoffs of office for all participants. The winning coalition is also likely to 
contain the largest party in the legislature which is commensurate with some of the extant 
literature on new democracies.111  
 
The ideological variables provide interesting results that contrast with research on Western 
Europe and new democracies in Latin America. Firstly, the ideological diversity of the 
potential coalition does not have a significant effect on government formation in CEE. 
Coalitions in Western Europe tend to have convergent policy preferences112 but in CEE the 
development of programmatic competition has been impeded be weak party system 
institutionalization. Furthermore, contestation that was structured by historical enmities 
between the former ruling party and the democratic opposition, combined with restrictions on 
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policy competition that the EU accession process enforced on political parties in CEE113,  
meant that actors in the coalition formation process based their decisions on considerations 
other than policy and ideology. Secondly, coalitions containing the median party are 
significantly more likely to take office in CEE. Although theory indicates that this should be 
the case114, empirical evidence from Western Europe is mixed.115 One potential explanation 
for this finding is that party alliances are less entrenched in CEE than in Western Europe, and 
indeed, as party systems in CEE have been so unstable, the median party in one legislature 
may not return to parliament following the next election. When this is the case, then the 
median party will have a greater freedom to negotiate and form coalitions with a wider range 
of parties than it would if it was part of a familiar bloc as is common in Western Europe. 
Once parties are established in a familiar bloc it becomes more difficult to defect from that 
bloc and retain credibility as a prospective governing partner.116 In CEE, a median party 
retains its strategically advantageous position in the bargaining space but is unencumbered by 
entrenched cross-party loyalties. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
The variables derived from existing scholarship provide some valuable explanations of 
coalition formation in CEE but also point to some important differences which indicates that 
the distinctive context of new democracies is a factor in coalition formation. The final two 
models in Table 1 explore the effect of the variables relating to the institutionalization of 
party systems. The second model contains the indicators of dominant parties and incumbency 
and the new party variable is added in model three. The dominant party variable is negative 
and significant in both models two and three indicating that coalitions containing a CSP are 
much less likely to take office than other potential governments. This result may be 
superficially surprising given that former dominant parties in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, 
27 
 
and Poland all formed governments within the first few years of the transition to democracy 
though this only laid the foundations for their future failure as discussed in the next section.  
 
Model 2 demonstrates that former dominant parties can alter the dynamics of coalition 
formation. CSPs, with one or two exceptions, are located at the moderate left of the 
ideological spectrum. However, their historical roots make these parties pariahs for some 
other parties in the coalition bargaining arena. This rules out some potential coalitions a 
priori and can lead to distortions in government formation if parties refuse to cooperate with 
CSPs and seek to form coalitions with ideologically distant parties that are not tainted by the 
associations attached to former dominant parties. For example, in 1997 the Freedom Union 
(UW) in Poland formed a government with AWS. The ideological distance between these 
parties, according to the Manifesto Project’s right-left scale was 19.01 points. The former 
dominant party, the SLD, provided a more ideologically compatible partner for the UW lying 
just 1.71 points apart on the left-right scale. However, the UWs roots in the democratic 
opposition movement precluded cooperation with the former ruling party. Of equal 
importance, the presence of CSPs undermines the development of party competition based on 
substantive policy issues as the regime divide structures contestation, at least in the first 
decade or so after democratization. 
 
The effect of former dominant parties on coalition formation across the region is shown in 
Figure 1. In every country potential coalitions containing a former dominant party have a 
lower probability of taking office. The impact of CSP presence in a coalition is particularly 
stark in Poland and the Czech Republic where democratic opposition movements had a better 
organizational form that naturally morphed into political parties that were antagonistic 
towards the former dominant party in the post-communist period.  
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The Polish CSP, the SLD, never managed to shake off its associations with the prior regime 
and struggled to build alliances with other parties in the system besides the Peasant Party 
(PSL) which was a satellite of the former ruling Communist Party. The Czech CSP, the 
KSČM, has suffered from its adherence to a far left ideology for much of the democratic 
period. This left the KSČM outside mainstream party politics even though it accrued more 
than 10 percent of the vote in every election since 1992 and has been represented in every 
legislature from that date. Other CSPs in the region have, periodically, managed to build 
alliances with other parties in the system; for example, the Social Democrats in Slovenia have 
formed coalition governments with the mainstream Liberal Democrats. The Slovenian 
successor party’s relative success is rooted in the pre-democratic era. The last League of 
Communists of Slovenia (LCS) government was not seen as unpopular or corrupt as many 
Communist governments were in the region.117 Reformist elements within the LCS were 
instrumental in the transition to democracy having gained predominance over the 
conservatives within the party in the mid-1980s.118 Furthermore, the LCS gained credibility 
from its opposition to the Yugoslav Communist Party which sought to tighten Belgrade’s 
control over the Yugoslav federal state.119 This lent the Slovene transition from authoritarian 
rule a distinct national separatist character rather than one of Communists against democratic 
reformers. As such, the ‘regime divide’ was not as salient in Slovenia in the post-transition 
period.  
 
Figure 1 also shows that coalitions containing the former dominant party in Romania are 
almost as likely to take office as any other potential government. Grzymała-Busse argues that 
the successor party’s domination of the transition process in Romania meant that it could 
oversee the creation of formal and informal institutions to the disadvantage of opposition 
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parties. The creation of a strong presidency, state funding only for parties that gained 5 
percent of the vote, and the use of state media to marginalize opposition all favored the 
former dominant party and limited the development of strong alternatives.120 This allowed the 
Romanian successor party to dominate until 1996 and since then it has remained one of the 
two leading parties in parliament. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Based on previous literature it was expected that the role of incumbency in new democracies 
would be dynamic; in post-election bargaining situations incumbency should be a 
disadvantage but in mid-term formation opportunities incumbents benefit from an incoherent 
opposition that results from weakly institutionalized party systems. The results in models two 
and three indicate that overall, incumbency is actually an advantage. Coalitions containing 
the party of the incumbent prime minister are not significantly less likely to take office while 
coalitions that more closely resemble the incumbent cabinet, as indicated by the similarity 
variable, are more likely to form the government.  
 
The coefficient and standard deviation of the similarity variable in model three indicate that 
there is heterogeneity between formation opportunities. Coalitions that more closely resemble 
the incumbents are advantaged 71 percent of the time but disadvantaged in 29 percent of 
formation opportunities.121 Existing literature suggests that this result should not be surprising 
but research also demonstrates that governing parties tend to fair poorly in subsequent 
elections as voters punish them for poor performance.122  
 
How then, can this result be interpreted? One answer is that the instability of governments in 
CEE has an effect in tandem with the inchoate pattern of party interactions. It is well-
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documented that CEE governments have a greater tendency to collapse mid-term than West 
European cabinets.123 This technically results in a new formation opportunity but often 
members of the previous government return to office albeit in a slightly reconfigured 
formula. For example, the four-party coalition led by Mikuáš Dzurinda in Slovakia from 
2002 broke down in 2005 and was subsequently returned to office as a three-party minority 
administration as no viable alternative government could be formed by the parliamentary 
opposition.  It is therefore likely that the effect of incumbency differs for governments 
formed after an election compared to those formed mid-term. This will be explored in the 
next section.  
 
Model three also shows that potential coalitions that contain a new party are less likely to 
take office but the coefficient is insignificant. The fact that new parties have no significant 
effect on the composition of the government is important given the common characterization 
of the CEE party landscape as one in which short-term success is relatively easy to attain. 
However, it also indicates that established parties have not managed to close off access to 
government for new parties as one may expect in a fully institutionalized party system.  
 
Overall, the variables relating to weak party system institutionalization improve our 
understanding of coalition formation in new democracies. Figure 2 shows the average gain or 
loss in predicted probability that is achieved when these variables are included in the model 
compared to the predicted probability of coalition formation obtained from a model 
containing only variables from established research (model one from Table 1). In every 
country except Romania the variables related to party system institutionalization improve the 
predicted probability of the coalition that eventually took office with the effect greatest in 
Poland and the Czech Republic. These results demonstrate that existing models only take us 
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so far in understanding government formation in new democracies. To gain a more complete 
explanation, it is necessary to consider the factors that set new democracies apart from 
established democracies. 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Interaction models 
 
To further explore the effect of party system institutionalization on coalition formation I 
specified a number of models including interaction terms to examine conditional effects.124 It 
was hypothesized that coalitions containing former dominant parties would be less likely to 
take office following the onset of the ‘third generation elections’ in CEE. The results of 
model four in Table 2 provide support for this hypothesis. This result informs us of both the 
development of party competition and government formation in CEE. It had been expected 
that over time, generational replacement among politicians and the electorate would erode the 
negative connotations that accompanied CSPs and these parties would become ‘normal’ 
players in democratic politics. In that case, coalitions containing the former dominant parties 
would be no less likely to take office than coalitions containing any other party.125 Instead, 
CSPs have seemingly been punished more severely as time has worn on for their failure to 
fulfil policy expectations and engagement in exploitative or clientelist practices when in 
government. Previous research had also indicated that CSPs would be more likely to form 
oversized coalitions as governing partners sought to insulate themselves against any 
reputational damage that ensued from allying with a CSP.126 Although model five does 
indicate that CSPs have been more likely to form oversized coalitions, this finding is not 
significant and the hypothesis is therefore rejected. 
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Incumbency also has a conditional effect. Models six and seven show that incumbency is a 
disadvantage for any government that forms post-election. These results reinforce previous 
findings on electoral outcomes which found that incumbent parties are routinely punished at 
the polls by voters for failure to fulfil policy goals or their participation (perceived or real) in 
corrupt activities.127 The Hungarian Socialist Party saw its vote share drop from 43 per cent 
in 2006 to 19 per cent in 2010 following the leak of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s 
confidential speech to his party in which he stated that the government had achieved nothing 
and had lied to voters for two years. The SLD in Poland lost 30 per cent of its vote share from 
2001 to 2005 partially due to Leszek Miller’s incompetent leadership of the government but 
primarily due to corruption allegations. The latter stem from the ‘Rywingate’ affair in which 
a film producer, Lew Rywin, claiming to represent ‘a group holding power’ attempted to 
extract a bribe from a newspaper publisher in order to influence the content of a media bill 
that was due to go before parliament.128 The government’s collusion was not proven but the 
SLD was severely damaged by the affair. In both Hungary and Poland the incumbents did not 
return to power. 
 
Both measures of incumbency used in this research have a significant negative effect on 
coalition formation once the timing of the formation opportunity is taken into account. 
Potential coalitions containing the party of the prime minister and coalitions that more closely 
resemble the incumbent governments are much less likely to take office following an 
election. The effect of incumbency can be seen in Figure 3 which illustrates the probability of 
a coalition taking office based on its similarity to the incumbent government and the timing 
of the formation opportunity. The left panel shows that coalitions that more closely resemble 
33 
 
the incumbent have a greater likelihood of taking office when the formation opportunity 
occurs mid-term. That there are relatively few observations at the zero point in this panel 
demonstrates that wholesale alternation of government, in which all incumbents are replaced 
by different parties, rarely takes place during a parliamentary term. By contrast, the greater 
number of potential coalitions at the zero point in the right panel demonstrates the high level 
of volatility of incumbent party bargaining power in CEE.  
 
I also argued that it was typical for incumbents to get back into government as a minority 
administration when the coalition terminates mid-term. Model eight contains an interaction 
term for minority coalitions and the timing of the formation opportunity. This variable shows 
that minority administrations are significantly less likely to take office when the government 
is formed after an election but not when the formation opportunity arises mid-term. The fact 
that minority administrations are not especially disadvantaged during mid-term coalition 
formation opportunities supports the proposition that incumbents often return to office as 
minority governments when the previous administration terminates prematurely. Taken 
together, these findings provide support for my hypotheses on the role of incumbency in 
government formation in new democracies. High electoral volatility stemming from weak 
institutionalization results in an incumbency disadvantage when bargaining takes place post-
election but the unstructured pattern of party interactions means that opposition parties are 
unable to act in a coherent manner to unseat incumbent governments when the formation 
opportunity takes place during a parliamentary term. 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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Finally, prior research has found that new parties had become more successful in the electoral 
arena in the later years of the democratic period in CEE and if so, then we might expect new 
parties to have a greater probability of participating in government.129 Model nine indicates 
that potential coalitions containing new parties have been more likely to get into government 
following the onset of the ‘third generation elections’ but this effect is not statistically 
significant. Together with the results from Table 1, this undermines the notion that weakly 
institutionalized party systems are particularly fertile ground for political entrepreneurs trying 
to gain access to government. The challenge facing new parties appears to be invariant over 
time even though the political space in many countries has opened up with a greater share of 
votes going to protest or anti-political parties.130 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this study, I have addressed the influence of weak party system institutionalization on 
government formation in new democracies. This is crucial as the institutionalization of the 
party system is considered to be a key distinction between new and established democracies. 
This is also the first systematic examination of government formation in new democracies 
that uses a comparable research design to the leading studies on established democracies. 
 
From this, three conclusions are worth highlighting that improve our understanding of 
government formation in general, and in new democracies in particular. First, incumbency 
has a conditional effect in new democracies. When the government formation opportunity 
takes place following an election incumbents are significantly disadvantaged. This is a result 
of the tendency for governing parties to suffer large losses in electoral support following a 
period in office due to failure to fulfil key policy objectives and, in many instances, their 
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engagement in clientalistic or corrupt practices. The lack of a stable core of electoral support 
may actually encourage governing parties to engage in clientalistic practices since voters are 
less likely to be swayed by partisan or programmatic appeals. On the other hand, when the 
formation opportunity arises following the mid-term collapse of a government wholesale 
alternation of the cabinet is rare and incumbent parties are more likely to remain in office. 
The weakness of party system institutionalization means that the parliamentary opposition 
struggles to act coherently in order to offer a viable governing alternative. Therefore, the 
incumbent administration can persist even if it falls into minority status. 
 
Second, former dominant parties play a significant role in coalition formation. In states where 
opposition political parties were not tolerated under the authoritarian regime a lack of affinity 
with parties in general, and the successor to the former ruling party in particular, became 
manifest following the onset of democracy. Furthermore, where former dominant parties 
remained strong contenders in democratic politics, party system institutionalization was 
undermined by the stunted development of programmatic competition. Instead, competition 
became structured by a regime divide between the former ruling parties and their now-
fragmented opposition. The net effect of this has been to place former dominant parties at a 
systematic disadvantage in the government formation process in CEE as they struggled to 
interact with other parties based on programmatic congruence. This has been compounded 
over time as the former dominant parties also suffered from the vagaries of incumbency. As a 
result, former dominant parties are even less likely to take office as democracy progresses. 
 
Finally, this study demonstrates that new parties have little impact on the government 
formation process. Given the weak institutionalization of party systems in new democracies 
one could expect that new parties would find it relatively easy to achieve rapid success. 
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However, the results of this research show that potential coalitions containing new parties are 
less likely to take office and that this effect has not changed over time, despite the greater 
proclivity of CEE electorates to vote against more established parties. Furthermore, both 
results are statistically insignificant. 
 
Overall, these results provide support for the argument that party system institutionalization 
influences government formation. Crucially, the weakness of party system institutionalization 
which results in the instability of relevant political parties in new democracies means that 
some variables produce different explanations of government formation in these countries 
compared to established democracies. Furthermore, distinct variables that relate specifically 
to weak party system institutionalization also need to be considered when examining 
government formation in new democracies. The evidence presented in this paper suggests 
that analyses of government formation can be improved by a consideration of the stability 
and routinization of institutions and political practices.   
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1. Mixed effects logit models of the determinants of coalition formation in new 
democracies 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
  
Coeff. 
(S.E.) Sig. 
Std. 
Dev.   
Coeff. 
(S.E.) Sig. 
Std. 
Dev.   
Coeff. 
(S.E.) Sig. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Minimal winning coalition 1.062 ***   1.041 ***   1.060 *** 
  (0.344)       (0.384)       (0.387)     
Minority government -1.726   8.745   0.062       0.048     
  (4.990)       (0.520)       (0.530)     
Largest party 1.774 ***   7.042   -8.490   6.247   -7.611 
  (0.304)       (5.514)       (4.968)     
No. Of parties -0.873 ***   -0.745 ***   -0.676 *** 0.256 
  (0.185)       (0.216)       (0.247)     
Pre-electoral coalition 
present 0.134       0.321       0.263     
  (0.297)       (0.379)       (0.381)     
Median party 0.618 **     0.662 * 0.044   0.658 * -0.113 
  (0.262)       (0.345)       (0.347)     
Ideological diversity -0.009   0.000   -0.005   0.011   -0.005   0.001 
  (0.011)       (0.013)       (0.013)     
Ex-dominant party present         -1.564 ***   -1.586 *** 
          (0.423)       (0.428)     
Party of incumbent PM         -0.690       -0.753     
          (0.554)       (0.551)     
Similarity         1.434 *** 2.535   1.395 *** 2.492 
          (0.444)       (0.446)     
New party                 -0.540     
                  (0.394)     
                        
Observations 16,393     15,439     15,439   
Formation opportunities 95     89     89   
Log-likelihood -336.408     -296.361     -295.561   
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01                       
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Table 2. Mixed effects logit models of interaction effects and coalition formation in new 
democracies 
    
Coeff 
(S.E.) Sig. Observations 
Formation 
opportunities 
Log-
likelihood 
Ex-dominant party X Third generation 
election 
Model 4 -1.289 ** 15,439 89 -296.328 
  (0.637)   
Ex-dominant party X Oversized 
coalition 
Model 5 -0.401   15,439 89 -298.132 
  (0.597)   
Party of incumbent PM X Post-election 
formation 
Model 6 -2.443 *** 15,439 89 -293.138 
  (0.736)   
Similarity X Post-election formation Model 7 -3.367 *** 15,439 89 -272.152 
  (0.525)   
Minority government X Post-election 
formation 
Model 8 -2.929 *** 15,439 89 -285.398 
  (0.662)   
New party X Third generation election Model 9 0.409   15,439 89 -282.293 
  (0.845)   
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01             
Note: All models also contain the variables from Model 3 of Table 1. For purposes of clarity only the results of 
the interaction effects are reported in Table 2. The full table is available on request. The minority government 
variable is replaced in Model 5 by an indicator of whether the coalition was an oversized government.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. The presence of former dominant parties and the predicted probability of coalition 
formation 
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Figure 2. Average change in predicted probability of coalition formation before and after 
inclusion of party system institutionalization variables 
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Figure 3. Impact of incumbency on coalition formation by the timing of the formation 
opportunity 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of variables in the analysis 
  Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Source 
Minimal winning 
coalition 
16,393 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Author's calculations 
based on data from 
European 
Representative 
Democracy Data 
Archive (Andersson, 
Bergman, and Ersson 
2014), European 
Journal of Political 
Research annual 
yearbooks, and Conrad 
and Golder’s (2010) 
dataset on government 
duration in CEE 
Minority government 16,393 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Largest party 16,393 0.50 0.50 0 1 
No. of parties in 
government 
16,393 4.51 1.82 1 11 
Pre-electoral coalition 
present 
16,393 0.66 0.48 0 1 
Ibenskas (2015), Chiru 
(2014), and author’s 
calculations 
Median party 16,393 0.50 0.50 0 1 Volkens et al. (2013) 
Ideological diversity 16,393 39.67 22.37 0 97.86 Volkens et al. (2013) 
Dominant party present 16,393 0.45 0.50 0 1 Tzelgov (2011) 
Party of incumbent PM 15,439 0.32 0.47 0 1 Author's calculations  
Similarity (standardized) 15,439 0.28 0.96 -1.27 2.45 Author's calculations  
New party present 15,439 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Author's calculations 
and Tavits (2007b), 
Sikk (2005), and 
Hanley and Sikk 
(2013) 
Note: Descriptive statistics are provided for the estimation sample 
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